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Abstract
Terrence Deacon’s views about the origin of language are based on a particular notion
of a symbol. While the notion is derived from Peirce’s semiotics, it diverges from that
source and needs to be investigated on its own terms in order to evaluate the idea that
the human species has crossed the symbolic threshold. Deacon’s view is defended
from the view that symbols in the animal world are widespread and from the extreme
connectionist view that they are not even to be found in humans. Deacon’s treatment
of symbols involves a form of holism, as a symbol needs to be part of a system of
symbols. He also appears to take a realist view of symbols. That combination of
holism and realism makes the threshold a sharp threshold, which makes it hard to
explain how the threshold was crossed. This difficulty is overcome if we take a mild
realist position towards symbols, in the style of Dennett. Mild realism allows
intermediate stages in the crossing but does not undermine Deacon’s claim that the
threshold is difficult to cross or the claim that it needs to be crossed quickly.
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1. Deacon’s account of the origin of language
In The Symbolic Species, Terrence Deacon (1997) has various theses about the origin
of language linked to the central idea that what is crucial is the development of the
human capacity for symbolic thought. One of the things that he sets out to explain is
the absence of simple languages (p. 12). Deacon’s work can be seen as part of a new
wave of interest in the origin of language, which encompasses investigation of the
social setting for language development, and the biological basis of various features of
language (Hurford et al., 1998). This paper deals especially with the philosophical
bases of Deacon’s views.
1.1 The Symbolic Threshold
The primary title of Deacon’s book identifies humans as the symbolic species. This is
not merely the claim that humans employ those symbols that constitute human natural
languages, but also the claim that the underlying human cognitive structure is
symbolic in nature (p. 22). This puts the cognitive aspect of symbolic thinking at
centre stage in the account of the origin of language rather than emphasizing complex
syntax, as Chomsky (1988) does.
While some talk of symbols focuses on their physical form, Deacon’s focus is on the
ability of symbols to represent things. Briefly, he considers that cognitive symbols
must form part of a symbol system and their representative function depends crucially
on their relationships with other symbols in the system (p. 83). More will be said
about that notion of a symbol in section 2. Deacon’s notion of a symbolic threshold
refers to a moment in evolutionary development before which creatures do not employ
symbolic reference. The existence of a threshold is related to the view that symbols
need to be part of a symbolic system. Crossing that threshold is difficult and he speaks
of a ‘symbolic barrier’ (p. 44). He dates the transition to the time of the late
Australopithecines (p. 348), though allows that other primates with special training
can make that leap (p. 84 ff).
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In Deacon’s view, it is necessary to have crossed the symbolic threshold for there to
be word meaning and reference. Thus, linguistic meaning is linked to symbolic
thought, which suggests an internalist account of linguistic meaning. On the other
hand, the social character of meaning is also recognized. The social character is said
to release the meaning of words from dependence on merely personal experience (p.
450). Nonetheless, once acquired, language can be employed in internal cogitation.
While this paper focuses primarily on the central notion of crossing a symbolic
threshold, it will be useful to look at the broader context in which that idea is
developed
1.2 Co-evolution
The subtitle of Deacon’s book is, “The co-evolution of language and the brain.” The
notion of co-evolution is well established in biology, describing, for example, how
certain species of flowering plants evolved reciprocally with certain species of insect
pollinators, so that each adapted to suit the characteristics of the other. Our interest is
in the way the biological evolution of the brain and the social evolution of language
involved that mutual adaptation. A modification to the brain that supports language
better enables language to flourish and improves the fitness of individuals. Deacon (p.
413) says the species has now reached the point where the capacity to acquire
language is over-engineered so as to be fail-safe. On the other side, a modification to
a particular language that allows it to be learned more efficiently and at an early age
will help that particular language to flourish at the expense of others. In this way,
language, like a parasite, adapts itself to its host as well as the host adapting itself to
the parasite.
The social evolution of language happens a lot faster than the biological evolution of
the brain and there is scope for language to do a lot of adapting. Deacon (p. 137 ff)
argues that the immature brain has characteristics that enhance the ability to acquire
symbolic thought, which channels the social evolution of language to favour early
acquisition. Deacon believes that work by Chomsky and his followers into innate
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language structures, which is offered as an explanation of how language is learnable,
neglects the way that language adapts to foster its learnability (Deacon, 1997, p. 102
ff).
1.3 Brain Development
The crossing of the symbolic threshold in evolution, as Deacon describes it, was
based, in part, on a development in brain structure. An increase in brain size is one
notable feature of the evolution of pre-humans into humans, but overall brain size is
not the major issue. The striking difference over this period was expansion of the
cerebral cortex, which distorts the overall pattern of neural connections. The pre-
frontal cortex of a human is about twice the size that an ape of our size would have (p.
218). Deacon links this explicitly with crossing the symbolic threshold.
Deacon (pp. 264-7, 300) claims the pre-frontal cortex, which supports higher level
associations, can support the creation of a system of virtual symbols, not purely based
in the pre-frontal cortex, but distributed in various parts of the brain. He discusses
extensively the role of the prefrontal cortex in relation to other parts of the human
brain, including the cerebellum, and discusses experimental evidence connecting the
prefrontal cortex with different forms of behavior. For example, he shows how it is
linked with behavior being removed from immediate stimulus control (pp. 259-264),
which is consistent with his notion of a symbol.
1.4 The Social Circumstances
Deacon (pp. 384-401) also has a thesis about the social circumstances in which this
kind of symbol processing, which carries processing overheads, was able to emerge.
Those circumstances involved group hunting, which provided protein important for
survival, especially for mothers and children. Males, who had exclusive sexual access
to certain females and thereby avoided supporting other men’s children, tended to
have more descendants and so behavior enforcing that exclusivity became entrenched.
But the group living created many opportunities for promiscuity, which led to
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instability. The solution was the introduction of natural language, which can allow for
promises of exclusivity to be made and enforced by the community.
This is a highly speculative account and would probably attract Lewontin’s (1996, p.
108) dismissive description as merely a story. Whether or not this particular part of
Deacon’s account is plausible, there need to be some kinds of evolutionary benefits
accruing from language acquisition that provide a plausible evolutionary path to our
current level of adaptation to language. Deacon (p. 352) notes that once symbolic
communication supported one social function it was available to support many others.
First steps in an evolutionary, or indeed co-evolutionary, process are particularly
fragile. At the stage where the brain is still not well adapted to symbol processing,
early use of language is hard for individuals to acquire. Deacon (pp. 401-3) has an
explanation of how that difficulty could be overcome. He suggests that in rituals there
can be frequent repetition of a series of signs, which are removed from their objects.
This occurs in a situation of emotional intensity where the signs can be seen in a new
light. His thought is that the relationships of signs to each other, which he sees as
central to being a symbol, can be appreciated in those circumstances. As will be
discussed in section 4.2, Deacon may need to view ritual as a structure that strictly
preceded language. Again, this scenario is speculative, but does further explore
possible paths in the evolutionary process.
2 Deacon’s notion of a symbol
We need to scrutinize Deacon’s notion of a symbol. He initially identifies the special
nature of human natural language, in contrast to other animal communication systems,
on the basis of its combinatorial power (p. 32). But the key difference is humanity’s
possession of a mental symbol system. We need to get as clear as we can about that
notion of a symbol.
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2.1 The basis in Peirce
Deacon derives his notion of a symbol from Peirce. One of three tripartite distinctions
made by Peirce in his semiotics is the distinction between icon, index and symbol
(Buchler, 1955, pp. 98-119). An icon refers by way of resemblance, as a picture
resembles its object. An index refers by way of being really affected by its object. For
example, a weathercock, is an index of the direction of the wind. The mind is drawn
by the index to think of the object. A symbol is something general that is based on
law, which is explained as involving convention or habit. Note that Peirce’s notion of
habit can include something inborn (Buchler, 1955, p. 113). Common nouns are
given as examples of symbols, as are signs of propositions and arguments.
Deacon’s view is that while other animals employ icons and indices, essentially only
humans have crossed the symbolic threshold and can employ symbols. The symbols
are supposed to rest on a base of icons and indices and are taken to be some form of
abstraction from the indices (p. 79 ff). What is said to be crucial is the way that
symbols relate to other symbols, as will be discussed in the next section.
There are reasons to doubt whether Peirce’s semiotics really provides the appropriate
philosophical background for Deacon’s claims. While Peirce did believe in a
hierarchical relationship among icon, index and symbol, his analysis intertwined those
notions in ways that are at odds with the sort of discrete stages that Deacon needs.
In Peirce’s scheme, an algebraic formula is iconic, for it can reveal unexpected truths,
as a map can (Buchler, 1955, pp. 105-6). Quantifiers are identified as indefinite
indices (p. 111). In neither case do we have something more primitive than human
language, but rather something sophisticated. Also, while an ordinary proposition is
in itself a kind of symbol, its interpretant must be taken as a form of index (p. 111),
pointing to what Hookway (1985, p.138) describes as ‘a state of affairs’. (It is a
general feature of Peirce’s system that any sign requires an interpretant: another sign
that provides an interpretation of the first.) For Peirce, icon, index and symbol are all
essential characteristics of a scientific language.
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Peirce describes demonstrative and personal pronouns as indices (Buchler, 1955, p.
107), although he also employs non-linguistic examples such as the weathercock.
Linguistic indices (or indexicals, as we now say) should be regarded as sophisticated
rather than primitive kinds of signs, as shown by their comparatively late place in
child language acquisition. The massive indexicality of a sentence such as “I am here
now,” is not evidence of it being a more primitive utterance that could express a more
primitive thought available to less advanced minds. Elizabeth Bates (1990, p. 169)
points out that young children avoid the problem of dealing with indexicals by using
their names to refer to themselves, employing the ‘Tarzan-Jane’ strategy.
In David Kaplan’s (1989, section VI) terminology, indexicals have a variable
‘character’; that is their ‘content’ varies systematically from context of utterance to
context of utterance. Or, as Elizabeth Bates (1990, p. 166) puts it, an indexical like ‘I’
involves shifting reference. A linguistic indexical thus involves a particular kind of
sophisticated convention and is strikingly different from a sign that an animal can be
trained to associate with a particular object or behavior. Indexicals are an integral and
fully fledged part of the symbolic system that is language.
Peirce himself was able to describe the special nature of a linguistic indexical. He
describes a demonstrative pronoun, which is a form of indexical, as a ‘rhematic
indexical legisign’ (Buchler, 1955, p. 116). ‘Rhematic’ just means that it represents a
certain kind of possible object (Buchler, 1955, p. 103) while ‘legisign’ refers to some
kind of conventional sign. Thus Peirce at least has a way of describing the
conventionality of linguistic indexicals using his more elaborate scheme. But Deacon
merely employs the icon/index/symbol hierarchy and sees the move to symbol use as a
fundamental cognitive shift. For him, an index is essentially more primitive than a
symbol. Deacon (p. 86) considers that when, for example, a chimp is taught to
associate an arbitrary shape with bananas (to be discussed in the next section) the
relationship is indexical. That kind of case does not appear to fit clearly into the
pattern that Peirce describes. It is unlike the case of the weathercock in which the
orientation of the sign is directly affected by the thing it represents. In Deacon’s
hands, ‘index’ thus tends to cover any sign individually connected with the world,
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which is at variance with Peirce’s notion. In the next section we shall see how indices
work for Deacon as the preparatory stage for ascending to the level of symbols.
If Deacon is to account for the sophisticated nature of linguistic indexicals he needs to
hold that they are essentially symbolic. But Deacon (p. 80) says that, “Words can
serve indexical functions as well, and are sometimes used for this purpose almost
exclusively, with minimal symbolic content.” He includes ‘there’ as one of his
examples. While he does allow that there is some symbolic content, he appears to be
overlooking the sophistication of the use of indexical words in language.
Thus, Deacon’s view on language and thought should be separated from Peirce’s
semiotics, as Deacon’s application is not wholly consistent with Peirce’s own notions.
Also, the way Peirce’s distinction between index and symbol gets reflected in
Deacon’s work is in danger of distorting our appreciation of the role of linguistic
indexicals. We would be wise to address Deacon’s notion of a symbol on its own
terms and not assume that its origin in Peirce’s work on semiotics makes it perfectly
clear.
2.2 Deacon’s notion of a symbol without Peirce
Leaving Peircean semiotics behind, here are some central features of Deacon’s notion
of a symbol.
Firstly, a symbol’s connection with its reference is not sustained by repeated
association between a symbol and an object or behavior (Deacon, 1997, pp. 67-8).
Behaviorist techniques can be used to teach an intelligent mammal to employ arbitrary
signs that are linked with specific objects or behaviors. Without continual renewal of
that correlation, the use of the signs lapses. Symbols, in contrast, can be employed
with little or no correlations with the behavior or object.
Secondly, symbols achieve relative independence from those correlations by forming
a system of symbols. Thus they have important connections with other symbols,
which compensates for a less robust correlation in experience with aspects of reality.
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“Their indexical power is distributed, so to speak, in the relationships between words”
(p. 83). This distribution can certainly be recognized in the way that words have their
meaning linked by definition to other words. So a word does not need to be correlated
with reality all by itself.
Deacon stresses that the distribution of indexical power in a system of symbols
depends crucially on syntactic relationships. He says, “… syntactic structure is an
integral feature of symbolic reference” (p. 100). He also says, “Symbolic reference
derives from combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities, and we therefore depend
on combinations both to discover it (during learning) and to make use of it (during
communication)” (p. 83). This feature of symbols appears to be a central part of
Deacon’s attempt to explain the ‘miracle of word meaning and reference’ (p. 43.
Deacon (p. 84 ff) throws further light on his understanding of the way symbols form a
system when he discusses how the chimps, Sherman and Austin, allegedly cross the
symbolic threshold. (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978). They are taught a language
consisting of arbitrary shapes, called ‘lexigrams’, which correspond to whole words in
a natural language. The chimps can utter sentences by depressing special keys on a
computer keyboard, which are marked with those lexigrams. They had been trained to
avoid ungrammatical sentences of the language, which had a simple verb-noun
structure.
Initially there were only 2 verb lexigrams, one of which is described as ‘give’ but
refers to the process of supplying solid food by a dispenser. There were 4 noun
lexigrams which referred to drink and to solid food. As new lexigrams were taught
they were picked up quickly and fitted into the structure already learned. Deacon (pp.
89-92) claims that producing the grammatical categories by abstraction saves a
significant memory load, and also makes it easier to learn which sentences containing
new lexigrams are permissible. There certainly is some potential for economy,
particularly when more lexigrams are involved. Rather than have to learn each pair as
a permissible sentence it is only necessary to learn which group that lexigram belongs
to and then fit it in to the verb-noun structure that is learned.
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On the basis of Sherman and Austin’s achievements Deacon (p. 86) claims that “They
had discovered that the relationship that a lexigram has to an object is a function of
the relationship it has to other lexigrams …” That insight is described as a process of
perceptual recognition of the ‘implicit pattern that might be recognized in the
relationships between the indexical associations’ (p. 93). The insight is supposed to
be essentially immediate, taking only the time appropriate to perceptual recognition.
The third feature of symbols that I am extracting from Deacon is that the system of
symbols needs to be based on processes that are ‘actively and spontaneously
adaptive’, processes that Deacon speaks of as iconic and indexical. The system must
“continuously evolve new means of fitting with and anticipating its environment” (p.
455). This remark comes in the context of what would be required to build an
artificial intelligence. For our purposes here, we should note that Deacon’s symbolic
system needs to be based on the kind of rich, perception based, interactions with the
environment that are characteristic of animals.
The final feature of symbols, as mentioned in section 1.4, is that symbols must be
sufficient to express promises. Note especially that promises involve a content that
concerns something not immediately available, as it relates to the future.
Here in summary, are the points about symbols that I have extracted from Deacon.
First, the use and significance of symbols are not merely sustained by frequent
correlations with experience. Second, the symbols crucially depend on their place in a
system of symbols, which involves both syntactic and semantic relationships among
symbols. This is the central feature, which enters into the account of how the leap into
symbolic representation takes place. Third, the symbolic system rests on the rich
interactions with the environment characteristic of animal brains. Fourth, the symbolic
system must allow promises about the future to be made.
2.3 Simple Languages and the Threshold
Remember that Deacon’s account is supposed to explain why there are no simple
languages. Other species have enough intelligence to handle a simple version of a
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combinatorial language and engage in complex communicative behaviors (p. 42). But
crossing the symbolic threshold is not easily done. Deacon (p. 378) explains that
symbolic learning is in conflict with associative learning and so the early stages would
be unstable. The shift into this style of representation is very demanding. “To learn a
first symbolic relationship requires holding a lot of associations in mind at once while
at the same time mentally sampling the potential combinatorial patterns hidden in
their higher order relationships” (p. 93). Only once the benefits of the new form of
communication were more fully realized would the benefits really outweigh the costs.
Deacon (p. 44) allows that once there were once simple languages, at the time of
humans crossing the symbolic threshold. As brains evolved to cope with them, the
languages became more complex and supplanted the simpler versions (p. 45). The
difficulty of crossing the threshold means that other species have not been able to
make a start in that co-evolutionary process, and hence there are no simple languages
to observe currently.
Let us accept that there is a plausible co-evolutionary path from the crossing of the
threshold to the present day. It is the period of the crossing of the threshold and the
events leading up to it that are difficult to describe. Deacon cannot be intending the
notion of co-evolution to apply to that period. Remember that the existence of a
threshold is bound up with the way that a symbol must be part of a symbol system, the
second feature discussed above. Deacon (p. 378) says, “Only after a complete group
(in a logical sense) of interdefined symbols is assembled can any one be used
symbolically.” This suggests a perfectly sharp threshold. Deacon’s very notion of a
symbol thus appears to make it hard for him to describe the process of crossing the
threshold. We are denied the notion of something that is nearly a symbol, which is
what we may need to describe the process leading up to the crossing of the threshold.
In section 4 we will explore a reinterpretation of Deacon’s view of symbols that better
accommodates the crossing of the threshold.
– 12 –
3 Is there a threshold to cross?
The claim that there is a threshold, which humans have crossed, can be divided into
two parts. The first is that simpler animals do not manipulate symbols and the second
is that human beings do. Both parts are contentious. For the first part I will consider
the case of insects and argue against the claim that they manipulate symbols. For the
second part I will compare the symbol manipulation hypothesis with a connectionist
hypothesis.
3.1 Maybe both insects and humans manipulate symbols
There is a tendency in cognitive science to assume many creatures employ symbolic
representation. Charles Gallistel (1998) uses a range of experimental evidence to
suggest that various insects have cognitive maps and claims that this involves
symbolic representation. If these insects have cognitive maps, then similar
considerations are likely to apply to a variety of mammals, birds and reptiles. Here is
an example of the relevant sort of accomplishment. An insect is traveling from A to B,
is captured and transported to C and can then establish a more or less direct route from
C to B. Certainly that suggests there is some kind of an internal map.
Gallistel (1998, pp. 6-10) argues that in order to do this kind of thing the organism
needs to evaluate mathematical functions. These functions can be embedded in each
other so that the value of a contained one becomes an argument for the containing
one. This makes the computational system ‘compositional’ in that the component
functions have a consistent interpretation. Natural languages are also said to have the
property of compositionality in that component words and phrases have a consistent
significance in an indefinitely large range of complex sentences. Deacon would have
to deny that navigation by a cognitive map is a case of a symbolic process, as he
wishes to draw a line between humans and most other creatures. Do cognitive maps
fail to meet the characteristics of symbols I have drawn from Deacon?
The first characteristic is that symbols are supposed not to be dependent on the kind of
repeated pairing with experience. Cognitive maps indeed do have that characteristic, if
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only because maps or even parts of maps are typically not uttered by the creature, as
they are the hidden guiding structure. Of course maps, if real, are acquired on the
basis of experience, and successful maze running indicative of maps is often
rewarded. But we still do not have any expression of the map paired with a situation.
Cognitive maps satisfy the first characteristic.
The second characteristic of symbols is that they are part of a system of symbols.
Whether cognitive maps involve a system of symbols depends on what one takes a
system to involve and what description of a map is thought to be appropriate. It could
be said that there is some kind of system to a map as the nature of a map is the set of
relationships among its significant parts, landmarks and so forth. This doesn’t seem
to be quite the notion of a system that Deacon is employing, though. He appears to be
thinking of something based more on syntactic and semantic structure.
If we were to follow Gallistel’s description of the computations involving the
cognitive map then we are dealing with something involving that kind of complexity.
The mathematical expressions he claims are evaluated have a recursive syntax and the
property of compositionality. This makes them comparable to the expressions of a
natural language from a syntactic point of view.
Gallistel’s account of cognitive maps can be challenged if there are alternative, non-
formalistic, ways of describing them. There seems to be no obvious bar to a
connectionist system that produced the appropriate output without doing the
mathematics. Certainly the analogy with the ordinary notion of a map does not suggest
that formalistic treatment. The kind of map we use every day to help us find our way
around is largely an analogue device. The arrangement of locations and relative
distances between them is available to visual inspection, and more precise estimations
of shortest routes can be found using that wonderful analogue device, a piece of
string. While there is typically a grid to locate particular streets or cities, that can be
regarded as additional feature to help identify particular locations in one’s field of
vision. If cognitive maps also have some kinds of analogue features, or in some way
are capturable by a purely connectionist system, then they do not involve symbolic
systems in the sense intended.
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The third characteristic concerns the basis of the symbols in a system of rich
interactions with the environment characteristic of animals. Let us take it that the
impressive navigational skills of the insects that Gallistel describes show that they
meet this characteristic.
The fourth characteristic is that symbolic systems could support promises about the
future. Leaving aside aspects of the speech act of promising such as intending and
moral commitment that arguably are absurd to apply to the insect world we are left
with the application of a proposition to the future. If a cognitive map could be said to
express a proposition, which would depend on it involving structured expressions,
then indeed it could be said to apply to the future. But, as we have found reason to
doubt the need for those structured expressions, then we consequently have reason to
doubt that a proposition about the future can be expressed.
The crucial point in this discussion is whether Gallistel is right to claim that dealing
with a cognitive map involves manipulating mathematical expressions. While the
matter is not settled, there is room for the view that insects with cognitive maps do not
thereby have a symbolic system. What holds true for insects could well hold true for
most or all non-human mammals. Moreover, the issue turns out not to depend on
anything very peculiar to Deacon’s notion of a symbol.
3.2 Maybe neither insects nor humans manipulate symbols
It appears we are not compelled to accept that symbol processing is ubiquitous in the
animal world. But maybe we are not compelled to accept that symbol processing
appears anywhere, which would be just as damaging for Deacon’s position. We
should look again at the way Sherman and Austin are said to have crossed the
symbolic threshold. Could there be a connectionist explanation of their achievements,
which avoids any appeal to cognitive symbols?
Connectionist systems can apparently perform certain kinds of generalizations without
explicit representation of any general notions. Consider, for example, those that can
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produce the past tenses of regular and irregular English verbs without any explicit
representation of the class of regular verbs (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986c). New
cases of regular verbs can be handled without further training. There is no explicit
representation of the past tense rule for regular verbs but the point most relevant here
is that there is no explicit category of regular verb.
Connectionist systems get the benefits of a generalization by merely overlaying
associations in a training sequence and acting on the basis of an implicit common
pattern with no need for an explicit higher level category. Just as there is no explicit
higher level category, so there is no registering of a relationship among each of the
regular verbs that they are of the same kind. So there need be nothing like Sherman’s
and Austin’s supposed recognition of relationships among lexigrams, if we were to
model their achievements in a connectionist way. The simplicity of Sherman’s and
Austin’s achievement makes the viability of a connectionist explanation seem
especially plausible. Scaling up to human use of language with a full recursive syntax
is more open to dispute, and there is considerable ongoing debate in, for example,
Smolensky (1998), Fodor (1998b), and Fodor and McLaughlin (1998). On the face of
it, Deacon needs to be able to rule out a connectionist explanation of both cases.
To deny, from a connectionist point of view, that humans or some other creatures
manipulate symbols is likely to be the denial that there are distinct physical items that
have a constant significance in different contexts. The focus is thus on the physical
form of a symbol. But the requirement of constancy of significance links up with the
second characteristic of symbols that I extracted from Deacon, which concerns the
way symbols form a system. Deacon would appear to be committed to affirming the
existence of symbols in humans in a way that is opposed to the connectionist
approach.
A broadly connectionist approach is compatible with different views on
representation, however. Gallistel (1998, p. 11) describes connectionism as
abandoning any notion of representation, but his portrayal of the connectionist is an
extreme one, which neglects connectionists’ own professed intention to capture a
notion of representation. “In our models we are explicitly concerned with the problem
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of internal representation and mental processing …” (Rumelhart and McClelland,
1986b, p. 121).
There may be ways to integrate connectionism with Deacon’s view. To pursue that
possibility, we need to consider the extent to which Deacon is, or should be, a realist
about symbols.
4 How real are the symbol systems?
The general tenor of Deacon’s discussion of symbols, symbol systems and crossing
the symbolic threshold suggests a fully realist approach to symbols, in the sense of
holding that symbols are real items in the brain. Indeed, devoting a third of the book
to the brain makes one anticipate an explanation of a clear neurological difference
between a species such as ours that is equipped for symbol using and other species.
But there are alternatives to a full realist approach to symbols.
4.1 Instrumentalism and Holism
In Deacon’s account, the meaningfulness of symbols employed in thought depends on
their membership of a system of symbols, which is a form of holism concerning their
significance. In Dennett (1978) we see a good example of a kind of holism alongside
a denial of realism, and we can usefully compare that with Deacon’s approach to
mental symbol systems. Dennett’s holism concerns intentional states, that is,
representational states such as beliefs and desires. His view is that something has
intentional states just in case its behavior can be predicted successfully by attributing
intentional states to it. This has been described as ‘instrumentalism’, supposing the
attribution of the intentional states is a mere instrument in the predictive calculation. It
portrays Dennett as not being realist about intentional states.
That apparent denial of realism sits comfortably with the holism. To attribute one
belief to an individual we need to take the intentional stance towards it. We treat it as
a rational agent and holistically construct a set of beliefs it ought to have given its
contact with the world, along with a set of desires it ought to have given its
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environmental niche (Dennett 1987b, p. 17). This enables us to provide predictions of
the individual’s behavior without supposing that there is something in the individual
that corresponds to each attributed belief and desire, let alone any word-like
components of those intentional states. In his later work, Dennett (1987b, 1987c and
1998) retreats from the earlier appearance of a complete denial of realism and claims
to adopt a sort of realism, which is a view we will return to.
4.2 Deacon’s realism and holism
As explained above, Deacon thinks that the meaning and reference of symbols in the
mind of a human being is not determined individually but holistically. The symbol
system as a whole connects with the observable world; the connection is not made
piecemeal, symbol by symbol. The general tone of Deacon’s view of symbols is
realist, though. The very talk of ‘the symbolic species’ suggests realism and the
material on the neurological basis of the human symbol system reinforces that
interpretation.
While instrumentalism of the kind attributed to the early Dennett requires holism, it is
not obvious that holism requires instrumentalism. One can hold that a perfectly real
set of symbols must be mutually self-supporting, like the poles of a frame tent.
Deacon could hold that a perfectly real system of symbols both underpins the
meaningfulness of a person’s utterances and provides a basis for their intentional
states. There needs to be caution in attributing symbol realism to Deacon, though, and
also it leads to the symbolic threshold being a sharp threshold, which is problematic,
as we shall see.
Deacon’s account is that symbols are distributed through various parts of the brain. It
seems natural to say that the symbolic system is a virtual system supported by a
connectionist style of neural computation. Deacon (p. 265) himself speaks of ‘implicit
symbolic reference’ and the way it ‘emerges from a pattern of virtual links’ (p. 266).
He also appears to endorse the work of Elman (1993) in using connectionist systems
to learn complex syntactic structure (Deacon, 1997, p. 132 ff).
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Merely describing Deacon’s symbol systems as ‘virtual’ does not settle the matter of
their reality, for the notion of a virtual machine is compatible with different levels of
realism. One can specify a virtual machine in relation to a more basic machine. A
piece of application software creates a virtual machine where the base machine is a
computer, with its operating system. But the operating system itself, which may be
largely a software construct, can itself be regarded as a virtual machine. Some
hardware description may specify a base machine but the division of function between
hardware and software is to some extent arbitrary. It is best to say that pieces of
software create functioning systems that are fully real.
In biological systems the distinction between what is innate and what is acquired can
be seen as parallel to the hardware-software division. But, again, the line is not as
clear as it first seems, as the DNA code contributes to form only in a certain
environment (Deacon, 1997, Chapter 7; Dennett, 1995, pp. 113-115). In considering
the place of symbols in the brain in Deacon’s system, it seems natural to say that the
system of symbols is created in the brain, relying on the basic plasticity of the brain
and on the symbol creating tendencies that are inherited. We shouldn’t deny reality to
a mental system just because it is learned. There is a parallel with Dennett’s view of
the way that consciousness depends on a virtual von Neumann machine realized on
the connectionist base of the brain (Dennett 1991, p. 218).
Nonetheless, there may be reason to question the reality of the virtual symbol system.
Even if a connectionist system, for the most part, is an implementation of a high-level
structure, its behavior may only approximate the high level description. Interest in
connectionist models can lie in relatively small divergences from the high level
descriptions (McClelland et al., 1986, p. 12). Holding that the symbols are distributed
in the brain makes it more likely that the underlying brain structure diverges a little
from the description at the symbolic level.
Rumelhart, et al. (1986, especially p. 44 ff) have an approach to the creation of such a
virtual symbolic machine in which what the brain does is initially model external
symbols and then manipulate them purely internally. Andy Clark (1990, Chapter 7)
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incorporates discussion of this passage into his exploration of the possibility that there
is no unitary architecture for the mind. The fundamentally connectionist architecture
of the brain can support a symbol processor, which is the basis of some of our
cognitive processes but not all. While Rumelhart et al. (1986) only speak of the
construction of the internal symbol processor happening in one individual, Clark
(1990, p. 134) speculates that the modification could become part of our innate brain
structure as a result of natural selection, though only as kind of kludge. This gives us
a way of understanding what the brain adaptation might amount to in Deacon’s co-
evolutionary process.
One of the issues that remain is whether the description of the virtual symbol
processor could ever be more than an approximation of the underlying brain behavior.
The connectionist line is that the connectionist basis of the symbol system is more
than an implementation detail and so the description of the symbol system is never
more than an approximation. If this were the correct way to regard Deacon’s symbols,
there would be reason to qualify our initial realist interpretation of his view. Deacon’s
text does not provide clear support for that interpretation, though.
We need not go to the other extreme and conclude that the high level description is
largely fictional or instrumentalist. In fact the best approach may be to adopt the form
of ‘mild realism’ that Dennett adopts in later work. He speaks of there being
objective patterns in human affairs that can be only detected from the intentional
stance (Dennett 1987b, p. 25). Patterns, as Dennett (1998, p. 99ff) explains them, can
be imperfectly instantiated, for the signal, which is the pure pattern, can be partially
distorted by noise.
Maybe we should also say there are real patterns in the brain, the symbols, that can
similarly only be detected using a symbolic stance (and maybe, in the future, a
connectionist, symbol-detecting, brain scanner). Even if the connectionist neural
system corresponds only imperfectly to the symbolic system, this can be accepted as
the signal being somewhat distorted by noise. In fact the symbolic stance to the brain
would be closely related to, and have to depend ultimately on, the intentional stance to
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the whole person, as we could only get any purchase on a symbolic system by
interpreting some behavior in an intentional way.
A parallel is here being drawn between Dennett’s mild realism about intentional states
and a proposed mild realism about symbols in the brain. Incidentally Dennett, for a
long time, has recognized that language use has enhanced our ability to have beliefs.
He has made a distinction between belief and opinion (Dennett, 1978c), where an
‘opinion’ is a belief that the believer can formulate to herself in words. Dennett is
happy to attribute beliefs where there are no opinions, but his interest in opinions
suggests an openness to there being some sort of threshold associated with language
use.
The outcome of this consideration of Deacon’s notion of a symbol is that, while his
holism appears to accompany a form of realism about symbols, it may be wise to
entertain a mild realist position about them. Deacon’s position can be reinterpreted to
be compatible with Dennett’s position about real patterns. Even if this can be
contested as an accurate exegesis of Deacon’s position it is a position that has much to
recommend it. There is something extremely implausible about a full realist approach
to symbols in the brain, as that goes hand in hand with a sharp threshold.
Consider the point at which Sherman and Austin have supposedly crossed the
symbolic threshold. They had already been trained to associate individual lexigrams
with items, but in Deacon’s view they were not employing them as symbols. For
Deacon, crossing the threshold is the moment when they recode the signs they know
to relate them to each other. Suddenly we have the miracle of word meaning and
reference. Deacon (p. 93) is perfectly explicit that the threshold at an individual level
is perfectly sharp, as it is the moment of perceiving the relationship amongst signs, as
described in section 2.2. Moreover, within a group, one individual must have crossed
that threshold first at the very beginnings of language. Of course, there are likely to
have been many false starts, as Deacon allows (p. 402). The problem is, how could
anyone have crossed the threshold without language in the environment? In speaking
of language we should not just think of spoken language as we are talking of a time
– 21 –
before the descent of the larynx. Deacon (p. 407) describes a plausible mixture of
vocalizations, gestures and use of objects.
The problem of how to cross the threshold without an existing language is especially
clear if we consider the suggestion in Rumelhart et al. (1986) that internal symbols
were initially models of external symbols. But even without the assumptions involved
in that approach the question remains. We seem to need to have a ‘language’ or at
least some kind of external symbol system prior to any individual crossing the
symbolic threshold internally. On Deacon’s view, though, words of that hypothetical
language would have lacked meaning, for crossing the symbolic threshold is what
produces word meaning. We seem to require a structure of calls or signs that, while
lacking meaning in itself, could be interpreted by an innovating individual to be
composed of meaningful inter-related symbols.
When Deacon discusses the origins of symbols in rituals he may be attempting to
describe such a situation. He describes the Yanomamö peace rituals (pp. 403-5) in
which there are series of threats that are not responded to. He also describes marriage
rituals (p. 406). For rituals to serve the role of pre-symbolic systems that lead up to
the crossing of the symbolic threshold we need to suppose that they existed prior to
the existence of even simple language. Even if rituals did play a role in a cognitive
shift in early language development it seems extreme to require that their emergence
strictly pre-dated the beginnings of deliberate communicative language. Indeed the
position is hard to understand even on Deacon’s terms. To have a ritual is to have a
system of signs, not just a series of isolated signs. Once there is a system we have the
central requirement of being a symbol system. If the ritual is a symbol system, we are
brought back to the question, how can individuals who lack symbolic thought create a
symbol system?
4.3 Mild Realism about Symbols
The apparent sharpness in Deacon’s conception of the threshold stems from the
combination of holism and realism. Symbol realism without the holism could permit
a gradualistic conception of the threshold, or even no threshold at all, for it could be
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thought that symbols appear one by one. It is the notion that symbols must
intrinsically be part of a symbol system that rules out that possibility. Holism without
realism also permits a fuzzy threshold or no threshold at all, as we shall see. It is the
combination of holism and realism that causes the troublesome sharpness of the
threshold, which makes it very hard to describe the lead up phase and the actual
transition.
While a perfectly sharp threshold appears to be a conceptual roadblock, this is a
separate matter from the debate concerning the speed of language emergence. Jean
Aitchison (1998), for example, distinguishes the ‘slow haul’ hypothesis from the
‘pop’ hypothesis in which languages ‘pop’ into existence. Leaving aside the
conceptual requirements of a sharp threshold there may well be reasons for thinking
that the process must have been fast. A group maybe needs to be able to advance
quickly together in order for the individuals to provide for each other the linguistic
environment that leads them into a new way of thinking and behaving. That claim
could still be made even without the artificial requirement of a perfectly sharp
threshold
Dennett, interestingly, combines holism about intentional states with gradualism. He
denies that there is a ‘magic moment’ along the scale of ever more complex organisms
at which they really have internal representations (Dennett 1987b, p. 32). He can
combine holism and gradualism because he has adopted no more than mild realism.
He can describe different degrees of intentionality as cases of a signal being distorted
by different amounts of noise. Clark (1990, 4.4) also employs a notion of gradualistic
holism, but it is not precisely the notion we need here. It concerns the way a complex
whole is built out of parts that have evolved separately as complete units.
Let us pursue a similar mild realist interpretation to symbols. Where Dennett talks
primarily about patterns in human behavior we should here talk of patterns of brain
activity. Symbols can be regarded as virtual symbols realized in that connectionist
base, as explained above in connection with Rumelhart et al. (1986) and Clark (1990).
There is scope on this interpretation for there to be brain states that express symbols to
different degrees, where the signal is distorted by different amounts of noise. If this
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thinking is combined with Deacon’s emphasis on a symbolic threshold we could say
there were a series of states of the brain going over the threshold that express the
pattern of a symbolic system with progressively less noise. It would allow him to
describe some intermediate cases as ones in which there was scarcely a mental symbol
system.
If a mental symbol system’s existence can be a matter of degree, then the existence of
word meaning and reference can also be a matter of degree. If there are degrees of
reality of word meaning and reference, we can say some series of sounds, gestures or
marks form what is scarcely or marginally a language. If we relax the realism
assumption about symbols it may also be natural to relax the holism assumption.
While may the development of complex messages may have been important in
bringing about the cognitive shift it would be sensible to allow that single sign
messages for such things as “Look over there!” or “Return home!” could have been at
least marginally symbols. This by no means solves all the real and troublesome
questions about how language began, but at least the concepts permit the description
of crucial intermediate stages that are required of a plausible explanation.
Deacon solved the problem of how one puts together a system without any component
parts by insisting on a firm division between indices and symbols and allowing that
indices but not symbols can be learned individually. The indices are the parts that can
be converted into symbols at one fell swoop. Deacon’s use of Peirce’s terms ‘index’
and ‘symbol’ has already been questioned in section 2.1. His rigid division between
‘index’ and ‘symbol’ is an essential part of an approach that involves a sharp
threshold. The consequence, as we have seen, is an implausible reliance on rituals
preceding languages.
Any detailed account of the crossing of the threshold, making use of a terminology
that allows some intermediate stages, can still allow that the threshold is a barrier.
Crossing the barrier may be difficult because of the costs of the cognitive
reorganization and it may need to be fast. Those things are both consistent with the
need for some intermediate stages. Deacon can still explain why there are no simple
languages in other species, on the basis of the difficulty of crossing the threshold.
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Thus a mild realist interpretation of symbols permits the expression of some of the
central features of Deacon’s position without a troublesome sharp threshold.
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